“It is too simplistic to go back to 1978–79. In terms of brutal repression and the number of deaths, there are similarities. But I would stop there”. Riccardo Redaelli, Professor of Geopolitics and of Asian History and Institutions at the Catholic University of Milan, analyses the Iranian crisis against the backdrop of the protests that have been sweeping the country for weeks. What emerges is an exhausted Iran, marked by deep social fractures and increasingly isolated even within its own region.
(Foto SIR)
The protests in Iran recall the 1979 revolution. Is this a fair comparison?
There are enormous differences. The Islamic Republic is a weakened regime, humiliated in recent years by Israel, which has dismantled Hezbollah, seen its allied Syria collapse, and demonstrated that it can strike almost with impunity inside Iran.
The economy is disastrous: the regime blames sanctions, but the truth is that it is badly managed, corrupt and incompetent.
The limited resources available are channelled into the nuclear programme and militias. Three quarters of the population detest the Islamic Republic, and millions of young people no longer identify with Islam. The generational divide is irreparable.
Iranian society today
In 2025, Iran’s population was estimated at around 92.4 million. The demographic structure remains relatively young, with a median age of around 35 anni. Economically, price instability and a fragile labour market weigh heavily, with inflation estimated at 32.5% and unemployment at 9,2% in 2024.
What is missing compared with 1979?
A structured opposition. At that time, Khomeini was leading from exile, the Tudeh was the largest communist party in the Middle East, and the liberals were organised. Today, only the name of Reza Cyrus Pahlavi circulates; he spends his time courting the United States and Israel and has never denounced the crimes of his father. We should not forget that the Shah had the Savak, the most feared secret police in the Middle East. People cheer him not out of monarchist nostalgia, but because they hate the current regime. It is a protest vote, not a political project.
What kind of protests are taking place?
Three, different but converging. The economic protests of an exasperated population: the once-prosperous Iranian middle class is now at breaking point. Then there are the protests of ethno-religious minorities — Kurds, Baluchis, Azeris, Sunnis — who are demanding autonomy. Finally, there are the protests of young people, women, and the more westernised segments of society, who are directly aiming to overthrow the system. What is new is their simultaneity: very distant groups see the regime as the common obstacle.
Why does the regime hold despite everything?
As long as the security apparatus remains cohesive, the regime continues to hold. The Basij represent the final link in the chain: they largely come from the poorest social strata and find in the system a rare means of social advancement.
Iran is a deeply class-based society, and this generates tensions that repression exploits.
When a Basij sees the ostentatious wealth of the upper districts of Tehran, that divide fuels resentment which easily turns into violence. It is first and foremost a social fracture, then a political one. And as long as this mechanism remains active and supported by the apparatus, the regime’s repressive capacity remains effective.
What scenario lies ahead?
In the long term, the regime is destined to collapse, because it relies exclusively on repression, and systems of this kind eventually give way. But that moment has not yet arrived.
An external intervention would be devastating: every strategy works until the adversary reacts, and in this case, the consequences would be unpredictable.
The United States does not even have an aircraft carrier in the area, and opening a conflict would mean committing to a total war, with no certainty about what might emerge afterwards. No one has an interest in the disintegration of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country such as Iran. Even the actors most hostile to the regime fear the vacuum that would be created.
How should the portrayal of the protests on social media be read?
However manipulable they may be, they show an exhausted country and have an imitative effect. Within the regime, some would like to ease the obsession with the veil, but the hardliners know that if you remove the veil and the “no to Israel”, nothing remains, only economic catastrophe. It is a regime reduced to a theatrical backdrop.
What regional dynamics are influencing the crisis?
The rift between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia is growing. The Emirates, aligned with Israel, have no public opinion: 90% of the population is foreign labour. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has a young national population, that is outraged by Gaza and concerned about the extremism of the Israeli far right. For this reason, it has entered into a strategic pact with Pakistan, and there are contacts to involve Turkey. In this scenario, Iran is isolated, weakened and less able to play the role of regional power it claims for itself.
The post Crisis in Iran. Mr Redaelli: “The regime is weakened, but without structured opposition, its collapse is not imminent” first appeared on AgenSIR.